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EDMOND v. GOLDSMITH: ARE ROADBLOCKS
USED TO CATCH DRUG OFFENDERS
CONSTITUTIONAL?
I. INTRODUCrION

"The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure
powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by
enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of
individuals."' Over the last several decades, the United States Supreme
Court has carved out several exceptions to the protections provided by
the Fourth Amendment. These exceptions include roadblocks used to
monitor the influx of illegal immigrants,2 roadblocks used to review
persons' license and registration,3 and roadblocks used to monitor
people who may be driving under the influence of alcohol.4
At first glance, it may seem as if the Court has drawn a bright-line
rule with regard to the constitutionality of roadblocks. Instead, a web of
inconsistency has been woven among the federal and state courts to
determine whether roadblocks used to apprehend drug offenders are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. On July 7, 1999, the Seventh
Circuit, in Edmond v. Goldsmith6 added another intricate layer to the
web of confusion. In this case, the court held that the roadblocks used
by the City of Indianapolis to apprehend drug offenders violated the
Fourth Amendment As a result of the split between the federal and
state courts, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
and will review this case October 3, 2000.8
This Note, beginning with Part II, will give a summary of the facts in
Edmond. Part III will outline the background of the law leading up to
1. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,554 (1976).
2- Id. at 566-67.

3. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
4. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
5. Compare Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
roadblocks set up for the purpose of arresting drug offenders are unconstitutional), with State
v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996) (holding that roadblocks used to catch drug
offenders are constitutional).
6. 183 F.3d at 659, cert. grantedsub nom. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 120 S.Ct. 1156

(2000).
7. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 666.
8. This Note was written prior to the Supreme Court's ruling on Edmond v. Goldsmith.
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Edmond. Further, Part IV will evaluate the court's decision in Edmond.
Finally, Part V will analyze the Seventh Circuit's decision, and consider
the requirement of individualized suspicion and the idea of purpose, as
opposed to the objective test of reasonableness, to determine whether
the Indianapolis roadblocks are constitutional.9
II. FACTS BEHIND EDMOND V. GOLDSMITH

On six separate occasions between August and November of 1998,
law enforcement officials in Indianapolis set up roadblocks along city
streets with the primary objective of apprehending drug offenders."
Each driver stopped at the roadblock was required to provide the police
with their driver's license and vehicle registration.11 While each
individual was stopped, the police conducted a visual inspection of the
car's interior,
and drug dogs were used outside of the car to detect illegal
12
substances.
As a result of these roadblocks, a class-action lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. 3 The
plaintiffs believed these roadblocks were unconstitutional and asked the
district court to enjoin the City of Indianapolis from continuing this
program. 4 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, and held the roadblocks to be constitutional. 5
The plaintiffs subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).16 In a narrow holding, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court.' Consequently, the court held the
Indianapolis roadblocks to be unconstitutional because they did not fall
into one of the four exceptions adopted by the court.'8 However, the
9. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). Rather than reviewing Chandler under
the test established in Brown v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated that a "search ordinarily
must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing;" however, there are certain
"exceptions to the main rule [that searches may occur without individualized suspicion] based
on 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.' Id. at 313 (quoting Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
10. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 661. Although the primary purpose of the roadblock was to
apprehend drug offenders, the police were successful at arresting traffic violators as well. Id.
11. See id.

12. See id.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. at 665-66.
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court noted that the lack of facts provided to the court made "ruling on
the legality of the City's program ... tentative. 9
III. THE LAW PRIOR TO EDMOND V. GOLDSMITH

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The United States
Supreme Court held that roadblocks constitute a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2 In some cases, the Court has held
that a police officer must have reasonable suspicion before a search or
seizure may occur.2 Conversely, when a roadblock is implemented, a
police officer is not required to have reasonable suspicion in order to
stop an individual.' Instead, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a seizure at a roadblock is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment only if the roadblock is reasonable. In order to determine
what is reasonable, the Court has adopted a balancing test that weighs
the legitimate government interest against the "Fourth Amendment

interest of the individual."2'
A. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. MartinezFuerte,26 used this balancing test to review whether a permanent

roadblock used to detect illegal immigrants was constitutional. In this
case, the Court held that the public interest of the checkpoint
19. Id. at 661, 666. The records provided to the district court during the preliminary
injunction proceedings were limited to the stipulation of facts from each party. Id. at 666.
20. Scott A. White, Note, The Constitutionality of Drug Enforcement Checkpoints in

Missouri,63 MO. L. REV. 263,282-83 (1998). The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 661.
22. Michael E. Brewer, Comment, Chandler v. Miller: No Turning Back From a Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 275, 278 (1997) (citations

omitted).
23. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,449-50 (1990).
24. Id. at 450.
25. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
26. 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
27. Id. at 555.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:571

outweighed the individual's Fourth Amendment interest.2 According to
the Court, "[t]he stops and questioning at issue may be made in the
absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
checkpoints. ,29 In previous cases, the Court held that probable cause or
consent must be present before a search at a checkpoint may occur.'
However, the holding in Martinez-Fuerte did not overturn the Court's

previous decisions, but only applied to checkpoints used to detect illegal
immigrants. 3
B. Delaware v. Prouse
After Martinez-Fuerte, the United States Supreme Court in
Delaware v. Prouse,3 2 reviewed the issue of whether "discretionary spot
checks"33 could be used to check the license and registration of an

individual. In this case, the Court faced the challenge of whether these
stops were of the same character as the roadblocks held to be
constitutional in Martinez-Fuerte.4 To distinguish Martinez-Fuertefrom

Prouse,the Court held there was no similarity between random stops on
city streets and the occasional roadblock used to stop all vehicles.35 In

particular, the Court recognized that "marginal contribution to roadway
safety... cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on
the roads to a seizure... at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement
officials."36

However, the Court suggested that less discretionary

methods, such as roadblocks, may be used as an alternative to random
stops to check the license and registration of drivers.
28. Id. ("In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts,
the Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the
individual.") (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 562.
30. Id. at 567. The Court referred to its decision in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975). In that case, the Court held that probable cause or consent must be present before a
search at a checkpoint may occur. Id. (citations omitted).
31. Id.
32. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
33. Id. at 655. A "discretionary spot check" is when the police randomly stop an
individual to check their license and registration. Id. at 650. This stop is conducted without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Id. at 655, 657.
34. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that a discretionary
spot check without probable cause or reasonable suspicion is unconstitutional), with United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (holding that roadblocks used to arrest
illegal immigrants are constitutional).
35. Prouse,440 U.S. at 657.
36. Id. at 661.
37. Id. at 663. (stating that its holding does not preclude the development of less
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C. Brown v. Texas
Following Prouse, the Court refined the balancing test in Brown v.
Texas' by establishing three specific elements that must be considered
to determine if a seizure is reasonable. 39 The test includes "the gravity
of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty."" This refined test would be adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in subsequent cases that addressed the
constitutionality of roadblocks."
D. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
Eleven years after Brown, the Court in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz42 adopted the three-prong test established in Brown.'
The Court decided whether sobriety checkpoints were reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment." As in Martinez-Fuerte, the United States
Supreme Court upheld these roadblocks as constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.45 According to the Court "[n]o one can seriously
dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States'
interest in eradicating it."
Consequently, the Court found that the
government's interest in the sobriety roadblocks outweighed the
individual's protection provided by the Fourth Amendment.47
E. Chandler v. Miller
After Sitz, the United States Supreme Court adopted a different
Fourth Amendment test in Chandler v. Miller." The issue before the
Court was whether candidates for public office should be required to
take a drug test. The Court once again had to decide if this issue was a
intrusive methods to check license and registration, such as the use of roadblocks).
38. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
39. Id. at 51.
40. Id.
41. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 469 U.S. 444,448-49 (1990).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 450.
44. Id. at 450. (stating specifically that "[tihe question thus becomes whether such
seizures are 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment").
45. Id. at 455.
46. Id. at 451.
47. Id. at 455.
48. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
49. Id. at 308.
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"limited circumstance[] in which suspicionless searches are warranted.""
In this case, the Court did not use the balancing test established in
Brown, but instead asked if there was a substantial "special need"51
beyond the scope of crime detection.52 This test allowed the Court to
carve out another exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement
that individualized suspicion must be present before a search can
occur.53 According to the Court, the drug testing requirement was not a
"special need,"" but symbolic in nature." The Court held the program
to be unconstitutional because "[t]he Fourth Amendment shields society
against state action" that "diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's
sake."56

As alluded to earlier, since the United States Supreme Court's ruling
in Sitz, federal and state courts have been split on whether roadblocks
used to catch drug offenders are constitutional.57 The majority of courts

have held that these roadblocks go beyond the narrow exceptions
carved out by the Court;5 8 however, a few courts have held these
roadblocks to be constitutional.5 9

F. United States v. Huguenin
For example, in United States v. HugueninW the United States Court
50. Id.
51. Id. at 314. Special need was defined by the Court as a "limited circumstanceo, where
the privacy interest implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
such suspicion." Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989)).
52. Id. at 313-14.
53. Id. at 313-14, 318.
54. Id. at 314.
55. Id. at 322. "Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing
must be substantial-important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy
interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individual suspicion." Id. at 318.
56. Id. at 322.
57. Compare Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
roadblocks set up for the purpose of arresting drug offenders are unconstitutional), with State
v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (upholding a roadblock used to catch
drug offenders as constitutional).
58. See, e.g., Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999); Commonwealth v.
Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429 (Mass. 2000).
59. See, e.g., Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Damask, 936
S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
60. 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998).
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that checkpoints used to arrest
drug offenders were a violation of the Fourth Amendment.' According
to the court, "the Airport Road checkpoint was more akin to a roving
patrol stop than to a sobriety checkpoint. ... ,62

G. State v. Damask
Conversely, in State v. Damask63 the Supreme Court of Missouri,
sitting en banc, reviewed whether roadblocks set up on highway exits
used to arrest drug offenders were constitutional. 4 The court upheld,
these roadblocks as constitutional because "the checkpoints effectively
advanced a sufficiently important state interest... [as] determined []
under Brown ....

,,65

IV. EVALUATION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN EDMOND
V. GOLDSMITH

In Edmond v. Goldsmith' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court when it held that
roadblocks established to detect drug offenders violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.67
Largely ignoring precedent, the court determined that the
Indianapolis roadblocks had to fall into one of the four exceptions
established by the Seventh Circuit.6 These exceptions include (1) when
the police have identified a fleeing criminal in a particular area; (2)
when there is not a specific criminal, but a circumstance where crime
prevention is impossible without a roadblock; (3) when there is a need
for a regulatory search where the objective is to protect a specific
activity, not for detecting criminal activity; or (4) when it is necessary to
prevent illegal import of goods or persons, a power limited to only the
federal government. 9
61. Id. at 563.
62. Id. at 561. Roving patrol stops, conducted by Border Patrol Agents, which are
random stops, without reasonable suspicion, of vehicles in an attempt to detect the transport
of illegal aliens, was found to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
Brignoni, 422 U.S. 873, 883-87 (1975).
63. 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
64. Id. at 567.
65. Id. at 575.
66. 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999).

67. Id. at 661.
68. Id. at 665-66.
69. Id. at 666.
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The Seventh Circuit did not begin its analysis by addressing the four
exceptions it adopted. Instead, the court asked whether reasonableness
of the seizure should be reviewed at the program level or individual
level.70 In dicta, the court determined that if the Indianapolis roadblocks
were analyzed on the program level they may be considered
reasonable.7'
Subsequently, the court dismissed this analysis when Judge Posner
stated "[b]ut courts do not usually assess reasonableness at the program
level when they are dealing with searches related to general criminal law
enforcement."72 Rather the court, quoting from Chandler,reasoned that
"'a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing...."' except in cases that involve "'special needs' based on
concerns other than crime detection.' ,7 This statement set the stage for
the four exceptions established by the court.
To establish the court's first two exceptions, the court focused on the
7
term "ordinarily" from the holding in Chandler.
' This analysis allowed
the court to carve two unique exceptions. These exceptions, unlike the
Indianapolis roadblocks, allowed for seizures of individuals to occur at
roadblocks for "urgent considerations of... public safety .... " 75 The
Seventh Circuit supported its proposition by illustrating that the United
States Supreme
Court has held roadblocks valid under less extreme
76
instances.
Next, to establish the court's third exception, the Seventh Circuit
had to acknowledge that some roadblocks, which have been found to be
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court, appear to involve
crime detection7n According to the court, the regulatory purpose of
these constitutional roadblocks was to secure the "safety or efficiency of
the activity in which the people who are searched are engaged." 78
Consequently, the court determined that the Indianapolis roadblocks

70. Id. at 661.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 662. (citing Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
73. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-314 (1997)).
74. See id. at 662-63.
75. Id. at 663. The exceptions illustrated by the court are roadblocks used to catch a
fleeing criminal and roadblocks to protect the public from a terrorist traveling with a car full
of dynamite. Id.
76. Id. The court referred to the decisions in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerteas examples of
less extreme cases upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
77. Id. at 663-64.
78. Id. at 664.
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did not fall into this exception because they were not for a regulatory
purpose, but rather, a "general program[] of surveillance which
privacy wholesale in order to discover
invade[s] [an individual's]
7
evidence of crime. ,
Finally, the court established the fourth exception by reasoning that
the issue of immigration is tied to foreign relations and foreign
Interestingly, the court distinguished the Indianapolis
commerce.s
roadblock from this type of roadblock by stating that the monitoring of
the influx of foreign commerce and people was a power81 limited only to
states.
the federal government, not one possessed by the
The court next transitioned from the four exceptions it established to
the underlying framework behind these four exceptions-the purpose of
the roadblock.8 In this case, the court distinguished between two types
of purposes: the purpose of the roadblock program, and the purpose of
the law enforcement officers at the roadblock. Subsequently, the court
dismissed the second purpose by noting that the subjective intention of
the police officer conducting the seizure is irrelevant.' Instead, the
court placed emphasis on the purpose behind the roadblock program
'
and stated "[t]he purpose behind the program is critical to its legality. "
In an effort to tie purpose into the court's four exceptions, the court
stated a roadblock must be "a bona fide effort to implement an
authorized regulatory policy rather than a pretext for a dragnet search
for criminals."86 The court noted that relying on purpose may lead to a
subjective interpretation of the Fourth AmendmentY Regardless of this
problem, the court still believed this analysis could strike a balance
between "abusive government conduct" and government needs."
Judge Easterbrook, writing in dissent, criticized the Seventh Circuit's
analysis by asking "[w]hy should the constitutionality of a roadblock
program turn on what its promoters think.., rather than on what

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 664-65.
82. See id. at 665.
83. Id.
84. Id. ("The test for the lawfulness of a particular search or seizure is an objective one;
the motives of the officer carrying out the search or seizure are irrelevant") (citations
omitted).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. See id.
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happens to the citizenry?" 9 Moreover, he asked, "[w]here does
purpose' come into the fourth amendment [sic]." 90
Judge Easterbrook argued that the roadblocks found constitutional
in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were not implemented for a regulatory
purpose,9 ' but similar to Edmond, these roadblocks were established to
detect criminal activity.' Further, Judge Easterbrook argued that the
Indianapolis roadblocks used to detect drug traffickers fall into the same
category as the roadblocks used to detect drunk drivers: both roadblock
programs are an example of "the list of searches and seizures justified in
the aggregate, without regard to person-specific cause...", and
therefore should be reviewed under the objective test of
reasonableness. 4
By analyzing Edmond under the reasonableness test, Judge
Easterbrook argued that the Indianapolis roadblocks passed
constitutional scrutiny because (1) "the privacy interest of drivers is
diminished relative to the interests of people at home or in the office;"
(2) "the invasion of privacy at [the Indianapolis] roadblock is slight;" (3)
"asmall invasion can be justified by aggregate success;" and (4) there
was no abuse of discretion because the Indianapolis police followed a
strict protocol when stopping individuals at the roadblocks. 9
Accordingly, Judge Easterbrook found that the first three elements
listed above demonstrated that the Indianapolis roadblock program
satisfied the objective test of reasonableness. 96 Moreover, the fourth
element of the list demonstrated that the roadblocks were not
"discretionary spot checks"' ' found unconstitutional in Prouse, rather
they were part of an established program that followed a strict

89. Id. at 667 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 669. ("Neither Sitz nor Martinez-Fuerteinvolved a regulatory inspection, yet
in each [case] the Court assessed reasonableness at the program level")
92. Id.
93. Id. at 668. Judge Easterbrook pointed to the following situations where criminal
searches have been upheld as constitutional: (1) "After making a custodial arrest, the police
may conduct a complete search of the person, including the contents of any packages he may
be carrying." Id. (citing United States v. Robinson 414 U.S. 218 (1973); and (2) "After
entering a dwelling to make an arrest, police may conduct a visual 'protective sweep' of other
rooms to ensure that armed occupants there do not pose a risk." Id. (citing Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325 (1990)).
94. Id. at 667, 669.
95. Id. at 669-70.

96. Id. at 670.
97. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See also supra note 33.

2000]

EDMOND v. GOLDSMITH

protocol.' Thus, similar to Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz, Judge Easterbrook
argued that the Indianapolis roadblocks were a government interest that
outweighed an individual's protection provided by the Fourth
Amendment.'
V. SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT APPLY THE TEST ESTABLISHED IN
CHANDLER V. MILLER TO DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF EDMOND V.
GOLDSMITH?
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Edmond steered away from the
conventional reasonableness analysis." In an unprecedented move, the
court did not use the three-prong test established in Brown to determine
if the roadblocks were in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead,
the court began its analysis by reviewing the holding in Chandler,
followed by the Court's previous decisions in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte °'
From this analysis, the court created four exceptions to determine when
roadblocks are constitutional."°
However, when the City of Indianapolis developed their roadblock
program, it did not know the program would be analyzed under the four
exceptions created by the Seventh Circuit. Rather, the City believed
that, consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Sitz,
the roadblock would pass constitutional scrutiny when analyzed under
the objective test of reasonableness.' When comparing the facts of Sitz
to Edmond, however, there is an important difference between these
two roadblocks; unlike the roadblock in Sitz, the Indianapolis
roadblocks were used to detect criminals, not to protect the public's
safety when driving on the roads.'
Therefore, this difference may
require Edmond to be reviewed under the Court's test established in
Chandler. 5
98. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 670.

99. Id.
100. See generallyBrown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (adopting a three-part test that
weighs "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty").
101. See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 662-64.

102. Id. at 665-66.
103. See id. at 669-70.
104. Id. at 663. See also supraPart III.D.
105. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997); Recent Cases, Constitutional

Law-FourthAmendment-Seventh Circuit Holds that Drug Interdiction Roadblocks Violate
the Fourth Amendment-Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), 113 HARV. L.
REV. 828 (2000) (stating "[a]lthough this 'special needs' framing of roadblocks is neither
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As illustrated in Part III of this Note, the Court in Chandlerstated
that there were certain situations where "special needs"" beyond
detecting crime could justify an invasion of privacy without
° Quoting from Skinner v. Railway Labor
individualized suspicion.'O
Executives Ass'n.. the Court defined "special need"' 9 as a "limited
circumstance[], where privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by
the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion.""'
The Court then looked at whether the drug-testing program in
Chandlerwas one of the many limited circumstances which override the
Fourth Amendment requirement that individual suspicion must be
Accordingly, the Court found no
present before a search can occur.'
evidence to demonstrate a correlation between drug abuse and State
officials elected to office; in other words, there was no important
government interest that would warrant a search without individualized
suspicion, and therefore no "special need""2 beyond crime detection
that could justify the drug-testing program."'
Similar to Chandler, the roadblock program established by the City
of Indianapolis was set up specifically to discover evidence of a crime
rather than for a "special need"'1 4 such as protecting the public's safety
on the road."' Although controlling the use of illegal drugs may be an
important government interest, like Chandler, these roadblocks
established in Edmond are symbolic in nature because there is no
evidence to demonstrate a correlation between drug traffic and traffic
fatalities, and thus these stops should require individual suspicion before

demanded by precedent nor standard for courts addressing such case, it is at least feasible,
and arguably appropriate given that the 'special needs' and road block balancing tests share
the substantial limitation that law enforcement interests are not relevant"). Id. at 832. See
also supra Part III.E.
106. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court stated that in order to determine "special needs," a
court "must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private
and public interests advanced by the parties." Id. See also supra note 51.
107. 520 U.S. at 314.
108. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
109. Chandler,520 U.S. at 314. See also supra note 51.
110. Id. at 314. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624).
111. See id. at 314-22.
112- Id. at 314. See also supra note 51.
113. See id. at 321-22.
114. Id. at 314. See also supra note 51.
115. See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1999)

2000]

EDMOND v. GOLDSMITH

a search may occur.
Consequently, if the Supreme Court decides Edmond under the test
established in Chandler,law enforcement officials will be restricted from
implementing roadblock programs specifically to discover evidence of a
crime. However, a roadblock program can be justified if there is a
government purpose that may be jeopardized because individual
suspicion is required.'
For example, a roadblock program established
to protect innocent drivers on the road from the harm of drunk drivers
is a government interest that may be in jeopardy if individual suspicion
is required.
Although the Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court's test in
Chandler and distinguished the Indianapolis roadblock program from
the programs established in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte,the court found
the Indianapolis roadblock program unconstitutional by focusing on the
purpose of the roadblock, rather than analyzing Edmond under the test
established in Chandler.7 The court examined purpose believing it
could strike a compromise that would allow the government to establish
roadblocks, as demonstrated by the four exceptions created by the
court, while shielding individuals from arbitrary invasion by law
enforcement.
Although looking at purpose appears to be a compromise, the court
may be opening itself up to a more subjective analysis, thus opening the
door for abuse." 9 For instance, if a clear line is not established as to
what constitutes purpose-the primary purpose of the roadblock, the
secondary purpose of the roadblock, or the primary and secondary
purpose of the roadblock-some courts may allow law enforcement
officials to set up roadblocks which piggyback an unconstitutional
purpose with a constitutional one.
An example of this dual-purpose roadblock is demonstrated in
Merrett v. Moore.'20 In this case, the court held that as long as one
purpose of the roadblock was constitutional, the second purpose was
irrelevant regardless of what it was.' The Edmond court created more
confusion by addressing in dicta the issue of dual-purpose roadblocks,

116.
117.
11&
119.
120.
121.

See Chandler,520 U.S. at 314.
Edmond, 183 F.3d at 665.
Id.
See id.
58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1550-51.
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also finding that only one of the two purposes need be constitutional.'"
For example, the Seventh Circuit noted that if the purpose of the
Indianapolis roadblocks was to detect drunk drivers, but a drug dog was
also used during the stop to locate narcotics, the roadblock may be
found constitutional.'
Thus, demonstrating the confusion that may
occur by focusing on the purpose of a roadblock to determine whether it
is constitutional.
The United States Supreme Court should take caution before
adopting the Seventh Circuit's four-exception test based on purpose.
Because this is a subjective test, the Fourth Amendment rights
guaranteed to citizens may be compromised. 12' This compromise may
ultimately lead the Court to carve out exceptions for a symbolic need,
rather than a substantial government purpose.'2' Alternatively, the
Court should follow the decision in Chandler and analyze Edmond
based on whether the roadblocks were established for a special need
beyond crime detection.
VI. CONCLUSION

Despite the public's concern about drug use in this country, an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights should not be violated in order
to obtain evidence against criminal wrongdoing. If individual suspicion
is not required for law enforcement officials to invade a person's privacy
at a roadblock, then the roadblock should be implemented only to
advance an "important governmental interest... [that would be] in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion." "
Consequently, if the United States Supreme Court were to find the
Indianapolis roadblocks constitutional, its decision may allow for "other
dragnet method[s] of criminal law enforcement... [to be seen as]
reasonable."1 27 By using the test established in Chandler, the Court will
avoid opening the door to Fourth Amendment exceptions that may lead
to arbitrary intrusion of an individual's privacy. It may be difficult to
draw a bright-line rule, but if the Court continues to carve out
122. See Edmond, 183 F.3d at 665.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 668.
125. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997). In Chandler,the Court adopted a
reasonableness test separate from the test established in Brown. Id. at 314. The Court's test
looked to whether the drug testing required for candidates seeking public office were for a
"special need" beyond the scope of crime detection. Id. See also supra Part III.E.
126. Chandler,520 U.S. at 314.
127. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 663.
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exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, it must clarify how far these
exceptions can go before an individual's rights are compromised.
SHANNON S. SCHULTZ*
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